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CRIMINALIZING SILENCE: HIIBEL AND THE CONTINUING 
EXPANSION OF THE TERRY DOCTRINE 
E. MARTIN ESTRADA* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It has not gone unnoticed that the Terry doctrine has expanded well beyond 
its original delimitations as set forth by the Supreme Court in 1968.1  Whereas 
a Terry stop was originally conceived as a narrow exception to the requirement 
that all governmental seizures be accompanied by probable cause—a 
nominally innocuous “stop and frisk”—the Supreme Court and its lower-court 
counterparts have since granted police officers broad arrest-like powers in 
executing a Terry stop.  These powers include the authority to move suspects 
and their passengers to different locations, detain suspects for extended periods 
of time, handcuff and point weapons at suspects, and force suspects to lie 
prone on the ground.2  This expansion has been criticized as a pernicious 
broadening of police investigatory powers by some,3 while heralded as an 
important means of allowing for effective law enforcement by others.4 
 
* Associate, Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP; Law Clerk to the Honorable Arthur L. Alarcón, U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 2003-2004; Law Clerk to the Honorable Robert J. Timlin, 
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, 2002-2003; J.D., Stanford Law School, 
2002; B.A., University of California at Irvine, 1998.  I would like to extend special thanks to 
Professor George Fisher, Judge John Crown Professor of Law at Stanford Law School, for his 
astute comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this article and his invaluable mentoring.  I 
am also indebted to Kerry C. O’Neill for her detailed editing of earlier drafts and thoughtful 
comments.  The views expressed in this article are solely my own. 
 1. United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1464 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that “[t]he last 
decade . . . has witnessed a multifaceted expansion of Terry.”); United States v. Chaidez, 919 
F.2d 1193, 1198 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that in recent years, the Terry doctrine has “expanded 
beyond [its] original contours, in order to permit reasonable police action when probable cause is 
arguably lacking.”); Robert Weisberg, A New Legal Realism for Criminal Procedure, 49 BUFF. L. 
REV. 909, 913 (2001) (observing that “the courts have found ample help in Terry in expanding 
search-and-detention power.”); Gregory Howard Williams, The Supreme Court and Broken 
Promises: The Gradual but Continual Erosion of Terry v. Ohio, 34 HOW. L.J. 567, 578 (1991) 
(arguing that subsequent Supreme Court cases have led to “the ultimate destruction of Terry as 
conceived by its creators.”). 
 2. See infra Part II.B. 
 3. See David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court 
Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 975, 1013 
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In Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada,5 the Court, by holding 
that officers could compel suspects detained pursuant to a lawful Terry stop to 
identify themselves without violating the constitutional protections afforded by 
the Fourth Amendment, wrote another chapter in the Terry doctrine’s 
unyielding expansion.  Hiibel, however, is not a mere furtive advance of the 
Terry doctrine.  Rather, it represents a sea change in our understanding of the 
very nature of a Terry stop.6  Unlike prior Terry-stop cases, Hiibel extends the 
Terry doctrine over terrain previously considered sacrosanct and absolute: the 
right not to speak.  Although the Court has chiefly addressed the right to not 
speak through the guise of the First Amendment, the Court in earlier days had 
indicated that a key premise underlying its creation of the Terry doctrine and 
its complicity in the Terry doctrine’s expansion was that officers would not be 
permitted to compel speech.  The Hiibel Court’s departure from the traditional 
right to not speak evinces the stark metamorphosis that the Terry stop has 
undergone since its original, limited inception. 
In favoring governmental law enforcement interests over core individual 
privacy interests, the Hiibel decision may be the doctrinal flood waters 
precipitating a slippery slope of eroding Fourth Amendment rights, predicted 
and feared by dissenting Justices in previous Terry doctrine cases.  Hiibel 
discards earlier Terry search limitations that tethered searches and seizures to 
officer safety and ensured that all investigations would be as respectful of 
privacy interests as possible.  With Hiibel, the Terry stop is evolving into a far 
more encompassing constitutional creation than originally contemplated by the 
 
(1998) (discussing the dangers in lower courts’ “increasing use of broad categorical judgments in 
place of particularized, individual suspicion” in applying the Terry doctrine); Tracey Maclin, 
When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 35 
(1994) (stating that Terry’s “narrow exception has been stretched and distorted so that 
government intrusions are now permitted in a variety of contexts that have nothing to do with the 
safety of patrol officers or the circumstances at issue in Terry.”); Williams, supra note 1, at 583–
84 (stating that due to the Terry doctrine’s expansion, race continues to be a divisive factor in 
police-community relations). 
 4. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Terry v. Ohio: A Practically Perfect Doctrine, 72 ST. JOHN’S 
L. REV. 911,  951–52 (1998) (lauding the clarity of the Terry doctrine as developed in subsequent 
Supreme Court cases); Christo Lassiter, The Stop and Frisk of Criminal Street Gang Members, 14 
NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1, 21–22 (1995) (“The expansion of Terry to include greater invasions of 
Fourth Amendment liberty interests in privacy and property quite properly reflect a changing 
panorama in the deteriorating mores in society and its crime fighting needs.”). 
 5. 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004). 
 6. See Shaun B. Spencer, Nevada Case Threatens to Expand Terry Stops, 48 BOSTON B. J. 
27, 28 (2004) (stating, prior to the Court’s issuance of Hiibel, that to accept any of Nevada=s 
arguments in favor of permitting officers to compel a detained individual to identify herself 
“would effect the most dramatic expansion in the Terry doctrine’s thirty-five-year history.”); 
David L. Hudson, Jr., ‘Nevada Cowboy’ Loses Privacy Showdown, A.B.A. J. E-Report, June 25, 
2004 (presenting contrasting attorney views describing Hiibel as either “a grave loss for privacy 
or an important victory for the police.”). 
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Court in Terry.  As such, the Court has critically altered the Terry doctrine 
landscape and further widened the Fourth Amendment hinterland that lies 
between freedom and traditional arrest. 
This article seeks to highlight Hiibel’s significance in expanding the Terry 
doctrine.7  Part II provides some important background to Hiibel: the Terry 
doctrine’s inception and the Court’s later expansion of the Terry doctrine.  Part 
III briefly outlines the legal history of “stop and identify” statutes and 
discusses their triumph in Hiibel.  Part IV discusses Hiibel’s conflict with the 
right not to speak under the First Amendment and Fourth Amendment and 
argues that Hiibel undercuts a central premise in the Court=s creation of the 
Terry doctrine—that officers would not be permitted to compel speech during 
a Terry encounter.  Part V addresses the Hiibel Court’s minimization of the 
weapon-based rationale for searches and seizures that featured so prominently 
in Terry and later cases.  This part also argues that Hiibel greatly expands the 
peculiar legal gap between freedom and arrest now occupied by Terry.  Part VI 
proposes an approach to curbing the erosion on individual rights through 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis—properly valuing privacy 
interests.  Part VII concludes. 
II.  THE BACKDROP: TERRY AND THE REMARKABLE EXPANSION 
OF THE TERRY DOCTRINE 
A. The Terry Doctrine’s Humble Beginning 
In Terry v. Ohio,8 the Warren Court confronted the constitutionality of a 
“stop and frisk” investigation, a law-enforcement technique in which an officer 
temporarily detains and searches a suspect without probable cause.9  As a 
preliminary matter, the Court rejected the contention that a “stop and frisk” 
 
 7. This article does not analyze the Fifth Amendment aspects of Hiibel.  Miranda issues, 
though, were an important feature of the decision.  See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2460–61 (discussing 
the inapplicability of Miranda to the compelled statements at issue), and id. at 2463 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (stating that “the compelled statement at issue in this case is clearly testimonial” and 
thus protected by the Fifth Amendment). 
 8. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 9. The Court’s notion of what a Astop and frisk@ encompassed was far from naive.  The 
Court described a “stop and frisk” as a “procedure performed in public by a policeman while the 
citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised.”  Id. at 16–17.  Eschewing 
delicacy, the Court went into further detail on the intricacies of a “stop and frisk”: “Consider the 
following apt description: ‘[T]he officer must feel with sensitive fingers every portion of the 
prisoner’s body.  A thorough search must be made of the prisoner’s arms and armpits, waistline 
and back, the groin and area about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down to the feet.’” 
Id. at 17 n.13 (quoting L.L. Priar & T.F. Martin, Searching and Disarming Criminals, 45 J. CRIM. 
L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 481, 481 (1954)). 
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investigation falls wholly outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment:10  
“[W]henever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to 
walk away,” the Court stated, “he has ‘seized’ that person.”11  Furthermore, the 
Court described the conclusion that a police pat-down is not a search as 
“nothing less than sheer torture of the English language.”12  The Court 
recognized that even frisking an individual’s outside clothing for weapons 
“constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security,” 
and “an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience.”13 
Nevertheless, the Court modified its previous Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence,14 and analyzed the police officer’s conduct under the “Fourth 
Amendment’s general proscription against unreasonable searches and 
seizures,”15 a method that involved a balancing of the governmental interests in 
the search and seizure against the invasion of privacy entailed by the search 
and seizure.16  Given the societal importance of allowing police officers to 
investigate nascent criminal activity and the physical dangers inherent in 
confronting suspected criminals in the streets, the Court opined that is was 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for officers to briefly detain 
individuals suspected of criminal conduct for investigatory purposes and 
 
 10. Professor Corinna Barrett Lain has pointed out that neither the State nor its amicus 
curiae supporters raised the contention that a “stop and frisk” is not covered by the Fourth 
Amendment during Terry’s litigation before the Supreme Court.  Rather, they argued that the 
“stop and frisk” at issue was justified by something approximating reasonable suspicion.  Corinna 
Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court’s Role in the 
Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1442–43 (2004).  The Court itself 
suggested that this position was put forward by the Ohio Court of Appeals.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 16 
n.12. 
 11. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 24–25. 
 14. Commentators have described the Terry Court”s determination that a “stop and frisk” is 
covered under the Fourth Amendment, yet not subject to the requirements of the Warrant Clause, 
as a compromise.  E.g., Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent 
Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 733, 777 (2000) (stating that in Terry, the Court sided with neither the State nor 
the defense); David A. Harris, Frisking Every Suspect: The Withering of Terry, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1, 12–13 (1994) (describing Terry as “a series of compromises”); Tracey Maclin, The 
Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 
1258, 1269 (1990) (stating that in Terry, “[t]he Court attempted to satisfy everybody with its 
ends-oriented decision.”); Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the 
Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 422 (1988) (describing the Terry decision 
as a “general compromise”).  But see Lain, supra note 10, at 1443 (arguing that Terry was not 
truly a compromise between opposing positions on whether the Fourth Amendment applies to a 
“stop and frisk,” but instead was “a profoundly pro-law enforcement decision that gave to the 
police almost all they had asked of the Court”). 
 15. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. 
 16. Id. at 20–21. 
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search the outside of their clothing for weapons: “[W]e cannot blind ourselves 
to the need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other 
prospective victims of violence in situations where they may lack probable 
cause for an arrest.”17  At the same time, however, the Court circumscribed 
police authority to detain and frisk individuals without probable cause, 
characterizing its holding as establishing “narrowly drawn authority to permit a 
reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer.”18  Only 
where an officer is possessed of a reasonable suspicion that “criminal activity 
may be afoot” and has a “reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety”19 may 
the officer pat-down the suspect, and even then “the officer’s action [must be] 
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 
interference in the first place.”20  The Court stressed that the “sole 
justification” for the instant search was “the protection of the police officer and 
others nearby,” and it was therefore necessary that the frisk of the suspect be 
correspondingly confined to detecting weapons.21 
Concurring in the opinion, Justice White cautioned that the Court’s 
approval of the “stop and frisk” in Terry should not be understood to signal an 
erosion of existing Fourth Amendment protections.  While noting that “[t]here 
is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a policeman from addressing 
questions to anyone on the streets[,]” Justice White stressed that a suspect does 
not forfeit her right to not speak merely by virtue of her having raised the 
reasonable suspicion of an officer.22  Even during a Terry stop, the Fourth 
Amendment protected a suspect from being compelled to answer an officer’s 
inquiries: “Of course, the person stopped is not obliged to answer, answers 
may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest, 
although it may alert the officer to the need for continued observation.”23 
In Dunaway v. New York,24 the Court elucidated its holding in Terry.  The 
Court explained that central to its approval of the “stop and frisk” at issue in 
Terry was its determination that “the intrusion involved in a ‘stop and frisk’ 
was so much less severe than that involved in traditional ‘arrests[.]’”25  It was 
willing in Terry to suspend the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause 
requirement for seizures with respect to a “stop and frisk” because of a Terry 
stop’s “less intrusive” qualities.26  The narrow exception to the probable cause 
 
 17. Id. at 24. 
 18. Id. at 27. 
 19. Id. at 30. 
 20. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. 
 21. Id. at 29. 
 22. Id. at 34 (White, J., concurring). 
 23. Id. 
 24. 442 U.S. 200 (1979). 
 25. Id. at 209. 
 26. Id. at 210. 
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requirement was justified in Terry and later Terry doctrine cases, the Court 
stated, “only because these intrusions fell far short of the kind of intrusion 
associated with an arrest.”27  Given this summary of the Terry doctrine, the 
Court held in Dunaway that the officers departed from the “narrowly defined 
intrusions involved in Terry and its progeny” by removing the defendant to an 
interrogation room in a police station.28 
B. Terry’s Great Push Forward 
Since Terry and Dunaway, the Court has continued to stress that Terry 
represents a “limited exception” to the general rule that a seizure must be 
justified by probable cause and to emphasize the differences between a Terry 
stop and a traditional arrest.29  The Court in United States v. Place, en route to 
holding that a ninety-minute seizure of luggage went beyond the limits of a 
Terry stop and thus rendered a subsequent property seizure unconstitutional, 
noted that “the Terry exception to the probable-cause requirement is premised 
on the notion that a Terry-type stop of the person is substantially less intrusive 
of a person’s liberty interests than a formal arrest.”30  Similarly, in Illinois v. 
Wardlow, the Court explained that the risk of detaining innocent individuals 
through a Terry stop is an acceptable risk precisely because a Terry stop falls 
far short of an arrest: “The Terry stop is a far more minimal intrusion, simply 
allowing the officer to briefly investigate further.  If the officer does not learn 
facts rising to the level of probable cause, the individual must be allowed to go 
on his way.”31 
Yet, despite its repeated representations that Terry stops are limited in 
scope and constitute a far less intrusive breed of seizure than an arrest 
supported by probable cause, the Court has steadily expanded the authority of 
officers to impose upon individual liberties during a Terry encounter.  In 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, officers effecting a routine traffic stop for an expired 
license plate ordered Mimms to exit his car and stand alongside it.32  After 
Mimms exited his vehicle, officers frisked him and discovered a concealed 
weapon.33  Observing that it was undisputed that the officers were entitled 
under Terry to briefly detain the vehicle, the Court held that the “additional 
intrusion” of further ordering Mimms out of his automobile could “only be 
described as de minimis.”34  Justice Marshall criticized the majority’s de 
minimis approach as a sharp departure from Terry’s requirement that any 
 
 27. Id. at 212. 
 28. Id. at 213. 
 29. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983). 
 30. 462 U.S. 696, 705 (1983). 
 31. 528 U.S. 119, 126 (2000). 
 32. 434 U.S. 106, 107 (1977) (per curiam). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 111. 
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intrusion on an individual’s personal liberty be accompanied by individualized 
suspicion.35  The reasons for the officers’ initial seizure of Mimms, Justice 
Marshall pointed out, had “no relation at all” to the officers’ order that he exit 
the car to be frisked.36  Justice Stevens similarly accused the majority opinion 
of eviscerating the requirement of individualized suspicion and “leav[ing] 
police discretion utterly without limits.”37 Justices Marshall’s and Stevens’ 
sober forewarning that Mimms would lead to a slippery slope of Terry doctrine 
expansion proved prescient.  The Court temporally expanded the scope of a 
Terry stop in Michigan v. Summers, where it held that a Terry stop may extend 
in duration beyond the brief time period approved of in Terry itself.38  In 
Maryland v. Wilson, the Court extended Mimms to hold that officers may order 
passengers as well as drivers out of vehicles detained pursuant to Terry.39  
Although the Court acknowledged that “there is not the same basis for ordering 
the passengers out of the car as there is for ordering the driver out,” in light of 
concerns for officer safety, the Court—echoing its de minimis approach in 
Mimms—held that “the additional intrusion on the passenger is minimal.”40 
Building upon the Court’s flexible approach to Terry, the lower courts 
have taken license to expand the scope of a Terry stop far “beyond [Terry’s] 
original contours.”41  This expansion has been “multifaceted” and broad.42  
Officers executing a Terry stop may now handcuff a suspect and draw their 
weapons in the suspect’s direction,43 force a suspect to lie prone,44 and move a 
 
 35. Id. at 113 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 36. Id. at 114. 
 37. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 122 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Another key fault in the majority 
opinion cited by Justices Marshall and Stevens was the manner in which the Court adjudicated 
Mimms: in a per curiam summary reversal, without oral argument, and solely on the basis of 
certiorari papers.  See id. at 114 (Marshall, J., dissenting), 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 38. 452 U.S. 692, 700 & n.12 (1981). 
 39. 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997). 
 40. Id. at 414–15.  Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Kennedy, again dissented, cautioning 
that the Court’s holding unwarrantedly expanded the scope of Terry stops by allowing an officer 
to order car passengers out of a vehicle without any individualized suspicion that the passenger 
poses a risk to the officer.  Id. at 416 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 41. United States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d 1193, 1198 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 42. United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1464 (10th Cir. 1993).  See also Mark A. Godsey, 
When Terry Met Miranda: Two Constitutional Doctrines Collide, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 715, 
728–733 (1994) (discussing the Terry doctrine’s expansion within the lower courts). 
 43. United States v. Vargas, 369 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that use of handcuffs 
did not transform Terry stop into arrest since such force was “reasonable under the 
circumstances”); United States v. Navarrete-Barron, 192 F.3d 786, 789–91 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that officers did not exceed limits of Terry stop by drawing weapons and handcuffing 
suspect whom they suspected was armed); Alexander v. County of Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1315, 
1320 (9th Cir. 1995) (“It is well settled that when an officer reasonably believes force is 
necessary to protect his own safety or the safety of the public, measures used to restrain 
individuals, such as stopping them at gunpoint and handcuffing them, are reasonable.”); United 
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suspect to a different location.45  As a practical matter, therefore, a modern 
Terry stop bears little resemblance to the “stop and frisk” at issue in Terry 
itself.46  In fact, a Terry stop is oftentimes scarcely distinguishable from a 
traditional arrest.47  As the Seventh Circuit has observed, “[f]or better or for 
worse, the trend has led to the permitting of the use of handcuffs, the placing of 
suspects in police cruisers, the drawing of weapons and other measures of 
force more traditionally associated with arrest than with investigatory 
detention.”48 
The Terry doctrine’s rapid expansion within the lower courts is hardly 
surprising in light of the Court’s creation in Terry of a boundless “reasonable 
suspicion” standard—a standard established by facts observed by an officer 
and inferences derived from those facts that, considered as a whole, 
“reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.”49  While the Warrant Clause previously 
controlled Fourth Amendment analysis,50 with Terry, subjective 
 
States v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326, 329 (4th Cir. 1989) (use of handcuffs to prevent suspect from 
fleeing did not automatically convert Terry stop into an arrest). 
But see United States v. Miles, 247 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Under ordinary 
circumstances, drawing weapons and using handcuffs are not part of a Terry stop.”); United 
States v. Acosta-Colon, 157 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating “that the use of handcuffs, being 
one of the most recognizable indicia of traditional arrest, ‘substantially aggravates the 
intrusiveness’ of a putative Terry stop.”). 
 44. United States v. Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221, 1227–28 (7th Cir. 1994) (“When a suspect is 
considered dangerous, requiring him to lie face down on the ground is the safest way for police 
officers to approach him, handcuff him and finally determine whether he carries any weapons.”); 
Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479, 1492–93 (11th Cir. 1991) (acceptable to make suspect lie 
prone on the ground during a Terry stop); United States v. Jacobs, 715 F.2d 1343, 1346 (9th Cir. 
1983). 
 45. United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44, 56 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that “it is well established 
that officers may ask (or force) a suspect to move as part of a lawful Terry stop.”); Halvorsen v. 
Baird, 146 F.3d 680, 684–85 (9th Cir. 1998) (approving of officers forcibly moving a Terry 
suspect from one location to another); United States v. Vega, 72 F.3d 507, 515 (7th Cir. 1995); 
United States v. Blackman, 66 F.3d 1572, 1576–77 (11th Cir. 1995). 
 46. See Harris, supra note 3, at 1021 (stating that “the Supreme Court of 1968 . . . might not 
recognize Terry as lower courts apply it.”). 
 47. See Omar Saleem, The Age of Unreason: The Impact of Reasonableness, Increased 
Police Force, and Colorblindness on Terry “Stop and Frisk,” 50 OKLA. L. REV 451, 452 (1997) 
(stating that the line between a Terry stop and an arrest has become blurred and “[t]his blur is the 
result of the lower courts expansion of the Terry decision and the Supreme Court’s reliance on an 
artificial reasonableness standard and colorblind constitutionalism.”); Godsey, supra note 42, at 
733 (“Terry stops—as a whole––have become much more intrusive than they were just a few 
years ago.  It is commonplace for these investigatory detentions to involve handcuffs, drawn 
weapons, the lying-prone position, the removing of the suspects to police cruisers, and other 
forms of force that used to be appropriate only for full-scale arrests.”). 
 48. Tilmon, 19 F.3d at 1224–25. 
 49. Terry v. Ohio, 329 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). 
 50. Sundby, supra note 14, at 386–91 (describing predominance of the Warrant Clause prior 
to Terry). 
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reasonableness “emerged as the central Fourth Amendment mandate and 
touchstone,”51 engendering “a whole new benchmark of individualized 
suspicion.”52  Although commentators differ in their evaluation of the ascent of 
reasonableness analysis via Terry,53 even calling for a more explicit 
proportionality approach to determining whether a search runs afoul of the 
Fourth Amendment,54 it is clear that the reasonable suspicion standard lends 
itself to broad applicability.55  What we are left with, then, is a haphazard, yet 
one-directional, broadening of police authority during a Terry stop. 
The growing similarity of a Terry stop to an arrest is unsettling.  The courts 
have made clear that the constitutional safeguards afforded to an individual 
during an arrest are diluted in the Terry-stop context.  First and foremost, the 
standard of proof necessary to justify a Terry stop is far less burdensome: 
reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause.  Although the probable cause 
requirement is by no means a substantial investigative hurdle,56 reasonable 
suspicion requires far fewer objective observations to justify a seizure.  
Whereas probable cause requires information justifying a reasonable belief that 
a crime has been committed by the person seized,57 a reasonable suspicion for 
 
 51. Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
1097, 1098 (1998). 
 52. Sundby, supra note 14, at 397. 
 53. Compare Amar, supra note 51, at 1118–20 (approving of Terry’s role in establishing 
reasonableness as the central Fourth Amendment measuring stick, partly because of the 
standard’s malleability in governing a “vast and protean set of governmental action”), with Scott 
E. Sundby, An Ode to Probable Cause: A Brief Response to Professors Amar and Slobogin, 72 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1133, 1136 (1998) (favoring Fourth Amendment analysis with probable cause 
as the centerpiece and stating that “[a] broadly defined reasonableness balancing test . . . largely 
places the citizen’s Fourth Amendment fate in the hands of others.”). 
 54. See generally Christopher Slobogin, Let’s Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the 
Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1053 (1998) (calling for a proportionality 
approach to the Fourth Amendment such that the lawfulness of a particular search and seizure is 
analyzed by weighing the degree of invasiveness of the search against the strength of the 
governmental interests involved); Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth 
Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1991). 
 55. See infra notes 57–62 and accompanying text. 
 56. See United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 915 (2d Cir. 1993) (characterizing probable 
cause as a low standard of proof); Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 
TEX. L. REV. 951, 996 (2003) (stating that probable cause is a “percentage nestled somewhere 
between .01% and 51%.”); Paul Wake, Helping Children Through the Juvenile Justice System: A 
Guide for Utah Defense Attorneys, 15 BYU J. PUB. L. 31, 47 n.68 (2000) (describing probable 
cause as a “low standard”). 
 57. Although there is no rigid formulation of probable cause, this general definition has been 
applied by the Court.  See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 557 n.6 (1978) (“[P]robable 
cause for arrest requires information justifying a reasonable belief that a crime has been 
committed and that a particular person committed it . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Other definitions roughly follow this formulation.  See, e.g., United States v. Fladten, 230 F.3d 
1083, 1085 (8th Cir. 2000) (“Probable cause exists when, given the totality of the circumstances, 
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Terry purposes requires only a “minimal level of objective justification for 
making the stop.”58  Reasonable suspicion can be established by information 
that is “different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable 
cause,” and that is “less reliable.”59  The Court has noted that “‘reasonable 
suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a 
showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.”60  Further, the 
Court has made clear that courts are to give deference to a police officer’s 
inferences of reasonable suspicion drawn from her law enforcement 
experiences61 and that reviewing courts must give “due weight to inferences 
drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement 
officers.”62  The layers of deference make it difficult to second-guess an initial 
finding of reasonable suspicion.63  Considering the relatively flimsy objective 
basis needed to justify a determination that reasonable suspicion exists and the 
deference to be accorded that determination, Terry’s reasonable suspicion 
standard can hardly be deemed insurmountable.64 
Moreover, in Berkemer v. McCarty, the Court noted that the 
“comparatively nonthreatening character” of Terry stops “explains the absence 
of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of 
Miranda.”65  Based on this statement in Berkemer, courts have held that 
officers are generally not obligated to give suspects Miranda warnings during a 
 
a reasonable person could believe there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime 
would be found in a particular place.”); United States v. Naugle, 997 F.2d 819, 823 (10th Cir. 
1993) (stating that “probable cause merely requires that the facts available to the officer would 
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that certain items may be . . . useful as evidence 
of a crime”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Hopkins v. City of Sierra Vista, 931 F.2d 524, 
527 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Probable cause requires ‘a reasonable belief, evaluated in light of the 
officer’s experience and the practical considerations of everyday life,’ that a crime has been, is 
being, or is about to be committed.”) (quoting United States v. George, 883 F.2d 1407, 1412 (9th 
Cir. 1989)). 
 58. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). 
 59. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). 
 60. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123.  See also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) 
(stating reasonable suspicion “falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the 
evidence standard”). 
 61. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273; Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700 (1996). 
 62. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699. 
 63. Cf. Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment: A Cultural Study of the 
Drug War, Racial Profiling and Arvizu, 47 VILL. L. REV. 851, 889–93 (2002) (discussing the 
levels of discretion afforded a finding of reasonable suspicion on appellate review). 
 64. See Martin H. Belsky, Random vs. Suspicion-Based Drug Testing in the Public 
Schools—A Surprising Civil Liberties Dilemma, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1, 19 (2002) (stating 
that “[t]he courts will most likely accept any articulated basis for a showing of reasonableness.”); 
William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2170 (2002) (stating that 
“Terry’s requirements are easily met.”). 
 65. 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984). 
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Terry stop in order to render a suspect’s answers to interrogation admissible 
during trial.66  In contrast, Miranda warnings are generally obligatory for 
admitting the fruit of a post-arrest interrogation.67  Rendering Miranda 
inapplicable to Terry stops substantially augments the peril to personal liberty 
created by Terry’s expansion since a broader realm of police investigatory 
conduct is shielded from Miranda protections.68 
Accordingly, the courts have overseen a steady expansion of the Terry 
doctrine.  Although police authority during a Terry stop still bears significant 
restrictions,69 it is clear that the Terry doctrine had evolved far beyond its 
original conceptualization as a narrow exception to the probable cause 
requirement.70  Hiibel represents a salient step in the Terry doctrine’s 
continuing expansion. 
III.  THE RISE, STUMBLE, AND TRIUMPH OF “STOP AND IDENTIFY” STATUTES 
Hiibel involved the constitutionality of a state “stop and identify” statute.71  
A “stop and identify” statute typically requires that when a police officer 
detains an individual under suspicion of criminal activity, the individual must 
 
 66. United States v. Pelayo-Ruelas, 345 F.3d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 2003) (stating that “most 
Terry stops do not trigger the detainee’s Miranda rights.”); United States v. Trueber, 238 F.3d 79, 
92 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating that Terry stops do not generally implicate Miranda); United States v. 
Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1109–10 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Burns, 37 F.3d 276, 281 (7th 
Cir. 1994); but see United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 673 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that 
whether an individual is “in custody” for Miranda purposes is a separate inquiry from whether a 
seizure is unreasonable under Terry); United States v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969, 976 (9th Cir. 2002); 
United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1464–65 (10th Cir. 1993). 
  In Hiibel, the Court held that the State did not violate Hiibel’s Fifth Amendment rights 
by compelling him to give his identity during the Terry stop but declined to address the issue of 
whether such an action could ever violate the Fifth Amendment.  See 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2461 
(2004). 
 67. See Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2608 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“[F]ailure to 
give [Miranda] warnings and obtain a waiver of rights before custodial questioning generally 
requires exclusion of any statements obtained.”); Jackson v. Giurbino, 364 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (“Miranda rights vest in the context of custodial interrogations.”); United States v. 
Johnson, 56 F.3d 947, 955 (8th Cir. 1995) (Miranda warnings mandatory for post-arrest 
interrogation). 
 68. See Godsey, supra note 42, at 747–48 (stating that the expansion of Terry creates a 
constitutional dilemma by narrowing the realm of seizures affected by Miranda). 
 69. A Terry stop requires articulable facts justifying an “objective justification for making 
the stop,” not merely a hunch that criminal activity has occurred.  See Wardlow v. Illinois, 528 
U.S. 119, 123 (2000).  Furthermore, although there is no defined time limit for a Terry stop, the 
Court has stated that the length of a detention can convert a Terry stop into an arrest.  United 
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709–10 (1983). 
 70. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 71. 124 S. Ct. at 2456. 
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provide the officer with some form of identification.72  “Stop and identify” 
statutes are an outcropping of common law vagrancy and loitering 
provisions,73 laws that were intended to deter “idlers” from engaging in 
criminal activity and to create a source of cheap labor for regional land 
owners.74  The modern source of the various state manifestations of the “stop 
and identify” requirement is the Uniform Arrest Act of 1941, an illustrative 
precursor to the Terry doctrine, which provides that an officer may detain any 
person “who he has reasonable grounds to suspect is committing, has 
committed, or is about to commit a crime, and may demand of him his name, 
address, business abroad and whither he is going[,]” and that failure to provide 
identification authorizes further detention.75 
Prior to Hiibel, the Supreme Court’s treatment of “stop and identify” 
statutes was critical.  In Brown v. Texas, the Court reversed a conviction under 
a Texas “stop and identify” statute where the defendant had refused to identify 
himself after officers detained him without any specific suspicion of 
wrongdoing.76  Because the initial seizure was “not based on objective criteria” 
and thus created “the risk of arbitrary and abusive police practices,” the Court 
held that application of the Texas “stop and identify” statute at issue violated 
the Fourth Amendment.77  The Court, however, expressly reserved the question 
of “whether an individual may be punished for refusing to identify himself in 
 
 72. See 1 JOSEPH G. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED § 3:7 (3d ed. 1996) 
(stating that “stop and identify” statutes authorize “the detention of individuals under suspicious 
circumstances and require the person so detained to provide identification and an explanation for 
his or her conduct”). See also Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2456 (citing various state “stop and identify” 
statutes). 
 73. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2456; Alan D. Hallock, Note, Stop-and-Identify Statutes After 
Kolender v. Lawson: Exploring the Fourth and Fifth Amendment Issues, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1057, 
1059 n.18 (1984) (stating that “[t]he origin of modern stop-and-identify statutes can be traced to 
vagrancy and loitering provisions”). 
 74. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 161–62, 161 n.4 (1972) (noting that 
vagrancy laws were a remnant of archaic feudal laws designed to discourage movement of 
workers and to prevent idlers from engaging in criminal activity); Ahmed A. White, A Different 
Kind of Labor Law: Vagrancy Law and the Regulation of Harvest Labor, 1913–1924, 75 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 667, 677–78 (2004) (stating that English vagrancy laws held “labor-regulating 
functions” by forcing the poor to work while preventing them from traveling in search of better 
wages); Joel D. Berg, Note, The Troubled Constitutionality of Antigang Loitering Laws, 69 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 461, 462–64 (1993) (discussing the  history of English vagrancy laws and stating 
that vagrancy laws of the Eighteenth Century, upon which American models were based, were 
designed to prevent crime and to put able bodies to work). 
 75. UNIF. ARREST ACT OF 1941 § 2, reprinted in Sam B. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 
28 VA. L. REV. 315, 320–21 (1942). See also COOK, supra note 72, at § 3.7 n.66 (quoting section 
2 of the Act). 
 76. 443 U.S. 47, 49 (1979). 
 77. Id. at 52–53. 
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the context of a lawful investigatory stop which satisfies Fourth Amendment 
requirements.”78 
Thereafter, the Court in Kolender v. Lawson invalidated a conviction under 
California’s “knock and announce” statute making it a misdemeanor for 
anyone “[w]ho loiters or wanders upon the streets” to refuse “to identify 
himself and to account for his presence” upon an officer’s request.79  Because 
the California state courts had interpreted the statute to require that an 
individual present “credible and reliable” identification, the Court held that the 
California statute was unconstitutionally vague in that it failed “to establish 
standards by which the officers may determine whether the suspect has 
complied with the subsequent identification requirement.”80  Again, the Court 
declined to reach the issue of whether compelling an individual to identify 
herself runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment.81 
Justice Brennan, concurring in the decision, however, did address the 
Fourth Amendment challenge, and he did so unfavorably to the “stop and 
identify” requirement.  “States,” he concluded, “may not authorize the arrest 
and criminal prosecution of an individual for failing to produce identification 
or further information on demand by a police officer.”82  This conclusion, 
Justice Brennan stated, followed from the strict limitations the Court had 
imposed on Terry stops, including Justice White’s concurring statement in 
Terry that “refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest.”83 While 
acknowledging that compelling suspects to identify themselves would serve 
important law enforcement interests, Justice Brennan opined that “the balance 
struck by the Fourth Amendment between the public interest in effective law 
enforcement and the equally public interest in safeguarding individual freedom 
and privacy from arbitrary governmental interference” weighed against 
expanding police power in this manner.84 
With Brown and Kolender, combined with Justice White’s concurrence in 
Terry, the constitutionality of “stop and identify” statutes hovered in doubt.85  
Not surprisingly, following the Court’s issuance of these decisions, some lower 
courts determined that officers were forbidden under the Fourth Amendment 
 
 78. Id. at 53 n.3. 
 79. 461 U.S. 352, 353–54, 353 n.1 (1983) (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(e) (1970)). 
 80. Id. at 361. 
 81. Id. at 361 n.10. 
 82. Id. at 362 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 83. Id. at 364–65 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) 
(White, J., concurring)). 
 84. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 365 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 85. Hallock, supra note 73, at 1075–80 (discussing uncertain constitutionality of the “stop 
and identify” requirement). 
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from compelling individuals to identify themselves during Terry encounters.86  
Others, noting that the Supreme Court had reserved the issue, held otherwise,87 
or deemed the issue unsettled.88 
With the precedential indications signaling the imminent demise of “stop 
and identify” statutes, the Court dramatically changed course in Hiibel, where 
it resolved the lower-court split in favor of the constitutionality of “stop and 
identify” statutes.  The facts in Hiibel, taken from the Court’s opinion, relate 
an unremarkable occurrence.  After receiving an afternoon telephone call 
reporting a possible roadside assault, a sheriff’s deputy was dispatched to 
investigate.89  The deputy discovered a man, later identified as Hiibel, on a 
Nevada road standing alongside his truck while a young woman (Hiibel’s 
daughter) sat inside the truck’s cabin.90  The deputy approached Hiibel, who 
appeared to be intoxicated, in order to investigate the criminal report.91  It was 
undisputed that the deputy possessed reasonable suspicion to detain Hiibel 
based on the domestic assault report.  During the course of the encounter, the 
deputy requested that Hiibel produce identification.  Hiibel refused and asked 
why the officer wanted his identification, to which the deputy responded that 
he was conducting an investigation.  Thereafter, Hiibel refused the officer’s 
repeated requests for identification.92  Instead, Hiibel placed his hands behind 
his back, challenging the officer to arrest him and take him to jail.  
Unfortunately for Hiibel, the officer accepted his challenge and arrested him.93  
 
 86. Carey v. Nevada Gaming Control Bd., 279 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
under the Fourth Amendment, officers may not “compel[] an individual to identify himself during 
a Terry stop”); Martinelli v. City of Beaumont, 820 F.2d 1491, 1494 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that 
“arrest[ing] a person for refusing to identify herself during a lawful Terry stop violates the Fourth 
Amendment’s proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.”); Timmons v. City of 
Montgomery, 658 F. Supp. 1086, 1093 (M.D. Ala. 1987) (agreeing with Justice Brennan and the 
Ninth Circuit that compelling identification violates the Fourth Amendment); State v. White, 640 
P.2d 1061, 1069 (Wash. 1982) (holding, based on Justice White’s concurrence in Terry, that “a 
detainee’s refusal to disclose his name, address, and other information cannot be the basis of an 
arrest.”). 
 87. Oliver v. Woods, 209 F.3d 1179, 1189 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that because officers 
were constitutionally permitted to ask for identification, officers did not violate the Constitution 
by arresting Oliver for failing to present identification in violation of a Utah “stop and identify” 
statute); Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. ex rel. Humboldt, 59 P.3d 1201, 1206 (Nev. 2002) 
(holding that because “[s]uch an invasion is minimal at best[,]” officers did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment in arresting an individual for failing to identify himself during a Terry stop). 
 88. At least four circuits had held, based on the Supreme Court’s reservation of the issue, 
that the right to refuse to identify oneself during a Terry stop is not clearly established.  See 
Risbridger v. Connelly, 275 F.3d 565, 572 (6th Cir. 2002) (discussing circuit positions). 
 89. 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2455 (2004).  See also Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1203 (recounting facts). 
 90. 124 S. Ct. at 2455. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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Hiibel was later convicted of resisting a public officer by not identifying 
himself as required under section 171.123 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, a 
“stop and identify” statute which provides that any person lawfully detained by 
an officer “shall identify himself.”94 
Applying Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis and balancing 
Hiibel’s individual privacy interests against the State’s law-enforcement-
related interests in coercing him to identify himself, the Court determined that 
the scales tipped in the State’s favor.  The Court noted that “[a]sking questions 
is an essential part of police investigations,” and that its prior decisions “make 
clear that questions concerning a suspect’s identity are a routine and accepted 
part of many Terry stops.”95  Compelling an individual to identify himself 
during a Terry stop, the Court stated, serves important governmental interests 
because “[k]nowledge of identity may inform an officer that a suspect is 
wanted for another offense, or has a record of violence or mental disorder.”96  
In the specific context at issue, a domestic violence investigation, the Court 
observed that officers “need to know whom they are dealing with in order to 
assess the situation, the threat to their own safety, and possible danger to the 
potential victim.”97 
The Court devoted little discussion to the other end of the balancing test, 
individual privacy interests, except to state that “the Nevada statute does not 
alter the nature of the stop itself.”98  Its dour view of the privacy interests 
implicated by “stop and identify” statutes was revealed in the opinion’s 
discussion of the Fifth Amendment issues: “Answering a request to disclose a 
name is likely to be so insignificant in the scheme of things as to be 
incriminating only in unusual circumstances.”99  Tipping the balance in favor 
of the State, the Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment was not offended 
when the deputy arrested Hiibel for failing to identify himself.100 
Hiibel’s holding is not without potential limitations.  The Court pointed out 
that the Nevada statute requires only that a suspect divulge her name and that it 
did not understand the statute to compel a suspect to turn over any 
documentation, including a driver’s license.101  This may indicate that the 
Court would not look favorably upon a statute that compels a Terry suspect to 
disclose more information than a name or to produce some sort of 
documentation.  Furthermore, the Court stressed that the identification 
 
 94. NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123 (2003). 
 95. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2458 (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985); 
Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972)). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 2459. 
 99. Id. at 2461. 
 100. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2461. 
 101. Id. at 2457. 
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requirement did not alter the duration or location of the detention,102 and that 
the request for identification had to be “reasonably related to the circumstances 
justifying the stop.”103  It should be noted, however, that these are questionable 
limitations.  After all, it is difficult to imagine when compelling answers to 
other inquiries, such as destination or residency, will ever significantly affect 
the duration or location of a Terry stop.  Also, under the Court’s broad view of 
the governmental interests furthered by identification, including advancing the 
investigation and allowing an officer to assess the dangerousness of the 
suspect, compelling identification will almost always be “reasonably related to 
the circumstances justifying” a Terry stop.  Thus, at this point it remains an 
open question how a more intrusive “stop and identify” statute would fare 
before the Court. 
There is little doubt that the Court’s approach in Hiibel lends itself to 
broader applicability.  Given the Court’s emphasis on the importance of 
permitting police questioning and investigation, and its rather dismissive 
posture towards individual privacy interests, it would not be surprising if, 
extending Hiibel, the Court were to approve of a more searching “stop and 
identify” statute.104  With Hiibel, then, the Court delivered “stop and identify” 
statutes their long awaited legal triumph.  This was no small feat considering 
the shroud of constitutional uncertainty surrounding “stop and identify” 
statutes following Brown and Kolender.  In so doing, the Hiibel Court effected 
a dramatic moment in the expansion of the Terry doctrine, and, in the process, 
jarred the previously stalwart notion of an absolute right to not speak in public. 
IV.  HIIBEL AND THE RIGHT TO NOT SPEAK 
A. The First Amendment 
The Court in Hiibel did not explicitly address the First Amendment’s role 
in a Terry stop, and the Court’s First Amendment decisions are distinct from 
its cases analyzing the Fourth Amendment.  Nonetheless, it is instructive that 
in authorizing police officers to compel answers to questions regarding 
identification, Hiibel’s outcome stands at odds with the well-established First 
Amendment right to not speak.  That the robust constitutional tradition of 
protecting the right to not speak was not heeded in Hiibel suggests a potential 
weakening in the right, at least at the margins of constitutionally protected 
speech.  Hiibel’s conflict with the right to not speak is more telling, however, 
in demonstrating how great an expansion of police power the decision 
 
 102. Id. at 2459. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See infra notes 169–72 and accompanying text (discussing possible extensions of 
Hiibel). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2005] CRIMINALIZING SILENCE 295 
represents.  In order to appreciate this, it is helpful to consider the solid body of 
precedential authority buttressing the right to not speak.105 
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court 
entertained a challenge to a West Virginia statute requiring, under threat of 
criminal prosecution, that teachers and students participate in a patriotic salute 
honoring the United States and its flag.106  The Court summed up the issue at 
hand: “[W]e are dealing with a compulsion of students to declare a belief. . . . 
The issue here is whether this slow and easily neglected route to aroused 
loyalties constitutionally may be short-cut by substituting a compulsory flag 
salute and slogan.”107 
The Court answered this question in the negative, noting that the Framers 
recognized objections to coerced acceptance of political ideas.108  Writing in 
the wake of political fascism’s apex and during the United States’s 
participation in World War II, the Court cautioned, “Those who begin coercive 
elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters.  
Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the 
graveyard.”109  Such undesirable possibilities were what the Framers feared 
and what the First Amendment was designed to avoid, the Court wrote.110  
Accordingly, West Virginia’s attempts to forcibly indoctrinate children, while 
more subtle, fell astray of the Constitution: “If there is any fixed star in our 
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe 
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”111 
In Wooley v. Maynard, the Court made more explicit the constitutional 
right to not speak developed in Barnette.112  There, the Court held that New 
Hampshire acted in contravention of the Constitution in criminalizing 
obstruction of the state motto, “Live Free or Die,” on state license plates.  En 
route to reaching this holding, the Court instructed that “the right of freedom of 
 
 105. For a general overview of the First Amendment right to not speak cases, see generally 
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 356–369 (1999); 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 804–06 (2d ed. 1988); Robert D. 
Kamenshine, Reflections on Coerced Expression, 34 LAND & WATER L. REV. 101 (1999) 
(surveying development of cases).  This line of authority is also referred to as the “compelled 
speech” doctrine.  See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra, at 356; Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech 
and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts after Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. 
L. REV. 697, 728 (2003); James P. Madigan, Questioning the Coercive Effect of Self-Identifying 
Speech, 87 IOWA L. REV. 75, 101 (2001). 
 106. 319 U.S. 624, 626 (1943). 
 107. Id. at 631 (footnote omitted). 
 108. Id. at 633. 
 109. Id. at 641. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. 
 112. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
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thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both 
the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”113  This 
was a fundamental tenet of the First Amendment’s broad aegis: “The right to 
speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of 
the broader concept of ‘individual freedom of mind.’”114 
The Court dispelled the notion that the right to not speak developed in 
Barnette and Wooley occupied secondary constitutional status in Riley v. 
National Federation of the Blind.115  There, North Carolina defended its 
regulation of professional-fundraiser fees by contending that the First 
Amendment interests in compelled speech are qualitatively less significant 
than the interests implicated in suppressing speech, such that state-sponsored 
schemes compelling silence ought to be reviewed under a more deferential 
test.116  The Court rejected this contention, stating, “There is certainly some 
difference between compelled speech and compelled silence, but in the context 
of protected speech, the difference is without constitutional significance, for 
the First Amendment guarantees ‘freedom of speech,’ a term necessarily 
comprising the decision of both what to say and what not to say.”117 
Significantly, the Riley Court noted that the First Amendment’s prohibition 
on compelled speech included statements of fact, as well as statements of 
opinion.  Previous precedential authority stating that the First Amendment 
protects the right not to speak, the Court wrote, “cannot be distinguished 
simply because they involved compelled statements of opinion while here we 
deal with compelled statements of ‘fact’: either form of compulsion burdens 
protected speech.”118  Thus, North Carolina’s attempts to compel 
communication of factual information related to professional-fundraiser fees 
conflicted with the constitutional right to not speak just as plainly as did New 
Hampshire’s attempts to compel opinion in Wooley.119 
The prohibition against compelled speech carries over to factual 
information regarding identity, where the line between idea and fact becomes 
blurred.  In Talley v. California, the Court held unconstitutional an ordinance 
requiring that a handbill distributed publically contain the name and address of 
 
 113. Id. at 714. 
 114. Id. (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637).  Accord Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985) (“There is necessarily, and within suitably defined areas, 
a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the same ultimate end as freedom 
of speech in its affirmative aspect.”) (quoting Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 
N.Y.2d 341, 348 (1968)). 
 115. 487 U.S. 781 (1988). 
 116. Id. at 796. 
 117. Id. at 796–97. 
 118. Id. at 797–98. 
 119. See id. at 798. 
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its sponsor.120  The Court expressed its high regard for anonymity.  Recalling 
the important role played by anonymous speech in the Revolutionary War, the 
Court stated that “[i]t is plain that anonymity has sometimes been assumed for 
the most constructive purposes.”121  The Court reaffirmed the First 
Amendment sanctity of anonymous speech thirty-five years later in McIntyre v. 
Ohio Elections Commission.122  There, the Court invalidated an Ohio election 
law prohibiting the distribution of anonymous leaflets in connection with 
political campaigns.  Especially with regard to public, political speech, the 
Court opined that  “[a]nonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the 
majority.”123  
Through these cases and others, the Court has stressed the constitutional 
centrality of the right to not speak, a right that takes no second chair to the 
affirmative right to speak.  The Court has made clear that the right to not speak 
is rooted in autonomy over one’s public image, as well as autonomy over one’s 
thoughts.124  The First Amendment right to not speak recognizes factual 
statements,125 and protects anonymity.126  Thus, it would seem that, generally 
speaking, the First Amendment would prohibit the practice of compelling 
factual information of identity in public.127  Until Hiibel, the Court’s decisions 
treated the right to not speak as sacrosanct and intimated no suggestion that 
this right might suffer erosion.  Indeed, if anything, the Court’s more recent 
language in support of the right to not speak resonated with the righteousness 
of Barnette and Wooley.128  Hiibel, though, represents a sharp departure from 
 
 120. 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960). 
 121. Id. 
 122. 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
 123. Id. at 357. 
 124. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (invalidating requirement that the State 
motto be displayed on license plates because it would force an objector to be “a ‘mobile 
billboard’ for the State’s ideological message”); Kari M. Dahlin, Note, Actions Speak Louder 
than Thoughts: The Constitutionally Questionable Reach of the Minnesota CLE Elimination of 
Bias Requirement, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1725, 1737–39 (2000). 
 125. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 797–98 (1988).  See also Madigan, 
supra note 105, at 127 (asserting that Riley’s most striking aspect was its recognition that 
compelled statements of fact burden speech). 
 126. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357. 
 127. The general right to refrain from answering a police officer’s questions during an 
ordinary police-civilian street encounter seems unperturbed by Hiibel.  See infra notes 190–93 
and accompanying text. 
 128. See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 481 (1997) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (stating that one of the principles of the First Amendment is “that compelling 
cognizable speech officially is just as suspect as suppressing it, and is typically subject to the 
same level of scrutiny.”); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 
515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) (“‘Since all speech inherently involves choices of what to say and what 
to leave unsaid,’ one important manifestation of the principle of free speech is that one who 
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the trend toward safeguarding the right to not speak, whether as to opinion or 
to fact.  What this portends in the First Amendment arena remains to be seen.  
In the Fourth Amendment context, Hiibel’s departure from the right to not 
speak represents a turning of the tide. 
B. The Fourth Amendment 
Hiibel’s impact on the right to not speak cannot be dismissed by pointing 
out that Hiibel addresses only a Fourth Amendment challenge rather than a 
First Amendment claim.  A key premise underlying the Court’s creation of the 
Terry doctrine and permissive acceptance of its expansion was the idea that an 
individual detained during a Terry stop, while susceptible to a wide array of 
police questioning, cannot be obligated to respond to an officer’s inquiries and 
cannot be arrested for maintaining her silence in the face of persistent 
questioning.129  Hiibel is all the more significant an expansion of the Terry 
doctrine in that it parts company with the Court’s earlier statements regarding 
compelled speech during a Terry encounter. 
Originally, the Court’s approval of the “stop and frisk” at issue in Terry 
was qualified by Justice White’s caution that while officers may ask questions 
of the detainee, “the person stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may not 
be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest, although it 
may alert the officer to the need for continued observation.”130  What the Court 
had approved in Terry, the White concurrence indicated, was a temporary 
seizure for investigative purposes and a limited search for weapons, not the 
annulment of the probable cause requirement.131 
Justice White’s words might have been marginalized more persuasively 
due to their concurring status had the Court not later adopted them in 
Berkemer.  As support for its holding that the Miranda requirement bars 
admission of post-arrest statements made by an arrestee but not pre-arrest 
statements made a detainee during roadside questioning by a police officer, the 
Court in Berkemer emphasized the relatively “nonthreatening character” of a 
Terry traffic stop in comparison to a formal arrest.132  One aspect of a Terry 
stop’s “nonthreatening character,” the Court explained, is that “the officer may 
ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and 
to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions.  
But the detainee is not obliged to respond.  And, unless the detainee’s answers 
 
chooses to speak may also decide ‘what not to say.’”) (citation omitted) (quoting Pac. Gas & 
Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 11 (1986) (plurality opinion)). 
 129. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nevada, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2465 (2004) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 130. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring). 
 131. Id.  Arguably, however, this is exactly what the Court did.  See Amar, supra note 51, at 
1118–20; Sundby, supra note 14, at 395. 
 132. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984). 
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provide the officer with probable cause to arrest him, he must then be 
released.”133  Berkemer thus made clear that the right not to answer an officer’s 
questions is a fundamental premise in permitting officers to detain and 
question individuals without probable cause under Terry. 
Given these prior statements by the Court disapproving of compelled 
speech in the Terry context, the persuasiveness of the Court’s decision in 
Hiibel turned on its ability to distinguish Justice White’s concurrence in Terry 
and Berkemer=s adoption of that concurrence.  In this regard, the Court’s 
opinion came up short.  First, the Hiibel Court summarily concluded that 
Justice White’s concurrence and Berkemer’s adoption of it were dicta and 
therefore not controlling.134  This conclusion, however, is disputable.  Under 
the commonly used definition, dictum is a statement “made during the course 
of delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in 
the case and therefore not precedential.”135  Arguably, the Court’s statement in 
Berkemer that a “detainee is not obliged to respond”136 to an officer’s inquiries 
during a Terry stop is not dictum because it was necessary to demonstrate the 
“nonthreatening character” of a Terry stop, which the Court was analogizing to 
a traffic stop.  The Court based its holding that a traffic stop is immune from 
the dictates of Miranda based partly on this “nonthreatening character.”137  
Without the statement that a detainee is not obligated to respond to an officer’s 
questions, the “nonthreatening character” of a Terry stop and traffic stop would 
certainly not have been as clear.  Furthermore, as Justice Brennan once noted, 
the fact that a particular statement is dictum is not an affirmative basis for 
 
 133. Id. at 439–40 (emphasis added) (citing Terry , 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J., concurring)). 
 134. 124 S. Ct. at 2459. 
 135. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1100 (7th ed. 1999).  See also In re Hearn, 376 F.3d 447, 
453 (5th Cir. 2004) (adopting Black’s definition of dictum); Best Life Assurance Co. v. Comm’r, 
281 F.3d 828, 834 (9th Cir. 2002) (same). 
  Judge Kozinski has etched out a more limited interpretation of what constitutes dictum 
by defining legal precedent broadly: “[W]here a panel confronts an issue germane to the eventual 
resolution of the case, and resolves it after reasoned consideration in a published opinion, that 
ruling becomes the law of the circuit, regardless of whether doing so is necessary in some strict 
logical sense.” United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 914 (9th Cir. 2001) (Kozinski, J., 
concurring).  Judge Kozinski’s interpretation was adopted by at least one panel of the Ninth 
Circuit. Miranda B. v. Kitzhaber, 328 F.3d 1181, 1186 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). This fact was 
not lost on Judge Kozinski.  See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 901 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kozinski, 
J., concurring).  Judge Kozinski added that the Black’s definition “is now so riddled with lesions 
and encrustations we can never be quite sure which portions of our case law are holdings and 
which dicta, unless and until the Oracle at Pasadelphi tells us.”  Id. at 901 n.1 (Kozinski, J., 
concurring). 
 136. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439. 
 137. Id. at 440. 
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adopting the alternative.138  Indeed, in many instances, dicta and concurring 
opinions have later been adopted as law by the Court.139 
Second, the Hiibel Court stated that the relevant passages in the White 
concurrence and Berkemer were not opinions as to the illegality of compelling 
responses to police inquiries under all circumstances, but rather they were 
recognitions that “the Fourth Amendment does not impose obligations on the 
citizen but instead provides rights against the government.”140  Because the 
source of the identification obligation in Hiibel was Nevada law and not the 
Fourth Amendment, the Court opined that the statements in the White 
concurrence and Berkemer regarding the illegality of compelling answers from 
Terry suspects were inapposite: “As a result, we cannot view the dicta in 
Berkemer or Justice White’s concurrence in Terry as answering the question 
whether a State can compel a suspect to disclose his name during a Terry 
stop.”141 
The Hiibel Court’s interpretation of the White concurrence and Berkemer 
rendered them redundant and nonsensical.  Again, the relevant language from 
the White concurrence: While “[t]here is nothing in the Constitution which 
prevents a policeman from addressing questions to anyone on the streets . . . 
the person stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, 
and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest . . . .”142  Under the Hiibel 
Court’s interpretation of this statement, Justice White began by discussing the 
Fourth Amendment as a protective mechanism (which does not prevent 
officers from questioning a suspect) but then sharply shifted the analytical 
paradigm, characterizing the Fourth Amendment as a font of obligations upon 
the citizen (which does not obligate citizens to answer questions).  This 
interpretation is absurd.  Even at the time Terry was decided, it was well-
established that the Fourth Amendment functions as a restriction on 
 
 138. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 455 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 139. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (adopting the two part test for determining 
whether a Fourth Amendment search has occurred set forth in Justice Harlan’s concurrence in 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)); Girardeau A. Spann, 
Color-Coded Standing, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1422, 1476-78 (1995) (discussing the Court’s 
adoption in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 655 (1989), of dicta written in the 
plurality opinion in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988), reallocating 
the burden of proof in Title VII cases); Gary E. Newberry, Note, Constitutional Law: 
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee: Is the Public Forum a Closed 
Category?, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 155, 156 n.8 (1993) (stating that in Commonwealth v. Davis, 167 
U.S. 43 (1897), where the Court affirmed the conviction of a preacher who had violated a city 
ordinance regulating speech in the Boston common, “[t]he Court adopted dicta from then 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes’ decision in the lower 
court.”). 
 140. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nevada, 124 S. Ct. 2451,  2459 (2004). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring). 
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governmental invasion of individual rights, not a source of obligations upon 
the citizenry.  One year after issuing its Terry opinion, the Court stated, “The 
Fourth Amendment to our Constitution prohibits ‘unreasonable’ governmental 
interference with the fundamental facet of individual liberty: ‘[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.’”143  Indeed, 
from the founding of the nation, the Framers intended the Fourth Amendment 
to limit government, not the rights of the people.144  The Court’s decisions 
have repeatedly recognized the Fourth Amendment as a protective 
constitutional provision.145  For Justice White to have devoted his concurrence 
to the obvious, well-established, and somewhat trivial point that the Fourth 
Amendment does not compel individuals to speak would have been as odd as it 
was unnecessary. 
This is especially evident focusing on the phrase “refusal to answer 
furnishes no basis for arrest.”  It would follow under the Hiibel Court’s reading 
of this passage that Justice White was communicating his view that the Fourth 
Amendment itself furnishes no basis for arresting individuals for failing to 
provide identification.  The Fourth Amendment, however, never functions as a 
basis for arrest.  It instead restricts governmental investigations and seizures, 
which themselves are based on some underlying proscriptive statute.146  Thus, 
Justice White=s statement under Hiibel’s interpretation would be wholly 
meaningless, as would Berkemer’s citation and adoption of Justice White’s 
concurrence.  This is not distinguishment, but rather disfigurement.  Logically, 
it would follow that Justice White intended to describe the Fourth Amendment 
in protective terms throughout his statement—to declare that the Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit officers from asking questions but does protect 
 
 143. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 202 (1969) (alteration in original).  The Hiibel 
Court, itself, noted this truism.  See 124 S. Ct. at 2459 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not 
impose obligations on the citizen but instead provides rights against the government.”). 
 144. ANN FAGAN GINGER, THE LAW, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PEOPLE’S RIGHTS 378 
(1977) (stating that the Framers wrote the first ten amendments with the intent to limit the new 
federal government that had been created); David A. Harris, Using Race or Ethnicity as a Factor 
in Assessing the Reasonableness of Fourth Amendment Activity: Description, Yes; Prediction, No, 
73 MISS. L.J. 423, 438–39 (2003) (stating that the history of the Fourth Amendment reveals that it 
was intended to serve as a limit on arbitrary government action). 
 145. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 380 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating 
that the constitutional purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to preserve “respect for the privacy 
of persons and the inviolability of their property”); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 589 n.5 
(1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that exceptions to the warrant requirement impinge on 
“the protective purpose of the Fourth Amendment”) (emphasis added); Stanford v. Texas, 379 
U.S. 476, 482 (1965) (noting that the Fourth Amendment was “the product of contemporary 
revulsion against a regime of writs of assistance,” and that its adoption “reflected the culmination 
in England a few years earlier of a struggle against oppression which had endured for 
centuries.”); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914) (stating that the Court has 
recognized the “principle of protection” captured in the Fourth Amendment) (emphasis added). 
 146. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; supra note 144. 
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suspects from being forced to answer those questions, even in the face of 
statutory authority to the contrary.147  In rendering the White concurrence and 
Berkemer’s adoption of it illogical, the Hiibel Court’s interpretation essentially 
disregards the Court’s prior language in favor of its contrary conclusion. 
By cavalierly distinguishing the Court’s previous statements that an 
individual detained pursuant to Terry cannot be compelled to answer an 
officer’s inquiries, the Court has disavowed a fundamental premise underlying 
the Court’s creation and expansion of the Terry doctrine—that Terry suspects 
cannot be compelled to answer officer inquiries.  The Hiibel dissent noted this 
in stating that, while the White concurrence and Berkemer’s adoption of it 
were “technically dicta,” they were “the kind of strong dicta that the legal 
community typically takes as a statement of the law.  And that law has 
remained undisturbed for more than 20 years.”148  Furthermore, the Hiibel 
Court completely ignored Justice Brennan=s concurrence in Kolender, in which 
Justice Brennan opined, based on the White concurrence, that the Fourth 
Amendment does not permit an officer to compel a Terry suspect to identify 
herself.149  Thus, long undisturbed language disapproving of compelling 
speech during Terry stops was discarded in Hiibel.  Had earlier members of the 
Court known that Terry suspects would one day be compelled to answer an 
officer’s inquiries, it is altogether possible that they would not have acquiesced 
to the Terry doctrine’s expansion and immunization from the safeguards 
accompanying arrest, such as Miranda warnings.  By unbridling the Terry 
doctrine from its earlier restrictions, the Hiibel Court has thrust open the door 
to the Terry doctrine’s further expansion into new Fourth Amendment 
frontiers. 
V.  HIIBEL AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT HINTERLAND 
A. The Expansion of Searches and Seizures under Hiibel 
1. An Oral Communication of Identification as a Search 
The question of whether or not a search has occurred centers on privacy.  
In general, a search occurs when “an expectation of privacy that society is 
 
 147. Indeed, generally, in interpreting legal language, the more logical reading is favored.  
See, e.g., United States v. Errol D., Jr., 292 F.3d 1159, 1168 (9th Cir. 2002) (Brunetti, J., 
dissenting) (favoring interpretation of Major Crimes Act that is most logical); Callas Enters., Inc. 
v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 193 F.3d 952, 957 n.5 (8th Cir. 1999) (favoring logical 
interpretation of complaint); Triad Assocs., Inc. v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 892 F.2d 583, 593 (7th 
Cir. 1989) (favoring logical interpretation of the Supreme Court’s language). 
 148. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nevada, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2465 (2004) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 149. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 362 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.”150  The Fourth Amendment, the 
Court has stated, “protects people, not places.”151  What is and is not private is 
determined by a combination of subjective expectation and societal acceptance 
of that expectation.152  While there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
that which is exposed to the public, “what [a person] seeks to preserve as 
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.”153  Although oral communications of identity are not as commonly 
associated with search and seizure as are narcotics or documents, the Court has 
instructed that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches 
extends to intangible oral communications irrespective of the “ancient niceties 
of tort or real property law.”154 
Surely, many people would have no problem providing police officers with 
identifying information, as well as other information, upon request.  The first 
prong of the Katz test, however, is subjective.  So long as an individual has a 
personal expectation of privacy in her identifying information, part one of the 
Katz test is satisfied.155  Applying the second part is more complicated—would 
society consider an expectation of privacy in identifying information 
 
 150. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). 
 151. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).  Professor Sundby has proposed that the 
Fourth Amendment be understood as having a broader aim of fostering reciprocal trust between 
the citizenry and the Government, rather than merely as an outpost for privacy.  Scott E. Sundby, 
“Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 
94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1777 (1994).  Focusing exclusively on privacy, he argues, makes the 
Fourth Amendment too speculative, “rising or falling in both scope and protection” as society’s 
notions of what is private have changed.  Id. at 1758, 1760.  It bears mentioning that under this 
citizen-government trust framework, compelling identification from a Terry suspect would also 
constitute a search since it connotes a lack of governmental regard for the dignity of the citizen in 
maintaining silence.  Arresting an individual for not providing adequate identification sounds in 
totalitarianism.  Id. at 1792–93. 
 152. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]here is a twofold requirement, first 
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the 
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”). 
 153. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
 154. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).  See also Alderman v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 165, 179–80 (1969) (stating that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on 
unreasonable searches covers covert recording of oral communications); Warden, Md. 
Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967) (“The premise that property interests control 
the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited.”).  Courts have held various 
governmental confiscations of intangible material to be searches and seizures under the Fourth 
Amendment.  E.g., Caldarola v. County of Westchester, 343 F.3d 570, 574 (2d Cir. 2003) (images 
captured on videotape); United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1334–35 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(images captured on photograph); United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(visual inspection). 
 155. See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 340 (2000); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 
740 (1979). 
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reasonable?156  If the strong public reaction to Hiibel is any indication,157 it 
seems that modern society recognizes as reasonable an expectation of privacy 
in identifying information.  The fact that people do not readily surrender their 
names or identities when in public underscores this point.158  The advent of 
mass solicitation, identity theft, and stalking crimes highlight the security and 
privacy interests tied to identification.159  Protecting identifying information is 
especially valuable in the internet age where the use, and abuse, of personal 
information abounds.160  Indeed, Congress has recognized the important 
individual privacy interests held in personal identifying information.161  While 
it may be that society has not always been so protective of identifying 
 
 156. Smith, 442 U.S. at 740. 
 157. J.D. Ducas, Letter to the Editor, BOSTON HERALD, June 24, 2004, at 42 (stating that with 
Hiibel, “[w]e’re beginning to resemble communist China more than freedom-loving America.”); 
Louis Kwall, Supreme Court Is Chipping Away at Our Rights Series: Letters, ST. PETERSBURG 
TIMES, June 24, 2004, at 15A (stating that, with Hiibel, “we are allowing the terrorists to win in 
that they are causing us to change not only our way of life, but also our core values.”); 
Commentary, What’s In a Name?  Police Power, ORANGE COUNTY REG., June 22, 2004 (stating 
that Hiibel erodes Fourth Amendment protections and “is a serious undermining of privacy 
rights.”); Editorial, Having to “Kowtow”, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 22, 2004 (stating that 
the Hiibel decision “is just the latest of many ways in which the court has poked holes in our 
cherished right of privacy.”); Opinion, Court Erodes Right to Remain Silent; Why an Exception to 
a Constitutional Right?, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, June 22, 2004, at 30A (telling readers that, with 
Hiibel, “[t]he U.S. Supreme Court took away a tiny bit of your independence Monday, a little 
piece of the individual autonomy that sets Americans apart from the citizens of so many other 
nations.”).  See also Editorial, Don’t Make Criminals of Citizens Who Remain Silent, DETROIT 
NEWS, Mar. 27, 2004, at 5 (prior to issuance of the Hiibel opinion, urging Court to side with 
Hiibel). 
 158. Lee Tien, Who’s Afraid of Anonymous Speech? McIntyre and the Internet, 75 OR. L. 
REV. 117, 117 (1996) (stating that people generally prize their anonymity and “selectively reveal 
information about [them]selves to some and withhold it from others.”); Carol Brooks Gardner, 
Access Information: Public Lies and Private Peril, 35 SOC. PROBS. 384, 387 (1988) (stating that 
anonymity is normal behavior that aids in our interactions, especially with strangers). 
 159. In fact, the Department of Justice’s public educational materials on identity theft 
cautions that one should “[b]e stingy about giving out your personal information to others unless 
you have a reason to trust them, regardless of where you are.”  U.S. Department of Justice 
website, at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/idtheft.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2004).  
Although many people would not fear that police officers would misuse their information, Hiibel, 
apparently, lacked a reason to trust the sheriff’s deputy who ordered him to identify himself. 
 160. See Harry A. Valetk, Mastering the Dark Arts of Cyberspace: A Quest for Sound 
Internet Safety Policies, STAN. TECH. L. REV. para. 119 (2004) (stating that “as more of us 
become more comfortable with using the Internet for everyday activities, we become more 
vulnerable to new types of privacy invasions.”); Vera Bergelson, It’s Personal but is it Mine? 
Toward Property Rights in Personal Information, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 379, 422–24 (2003) 
(highlighting significant costs expended in protecting privacy in the internet). 
 161. See The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–2725 (2004) 
(regulating the disclosure of personal information contained in the records of state motor vehicle 
departments). 
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information, the Court has recognized that notions of what constitute 
acceptable privacy interests can evolve over time, mirroring changes in societal 
norms.162 
Furthermore, surrendering identifying information to governmental 
authorities is qualitatively different from giving a name to some private party 
(a marketer, new acquaintance, etc.).  First, of course, providing a private party 
with identifying information is consensual, which is not the case where officers 
compel identification through a “stop and identify” statute.  Even a successful 
request for identification under those circumstances would be based on “no 
more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority”163 and thus be 
involuntary.  Second, the Government has the capacity to use your name or 
other nonpublic identifying information to access unparalleled amounts of 
personal information.164  The Court has indicated that while the use of 
technology to enhance investigatory capabilities does not automatically 
establish a search,165 it is more likely that a search has occurred within the 
meaning of Katz when that technology is “not in general public use”166 and 
circumvents the protections of the Fourth Amendment.167  The informational 
databases available to governmental authorities in conducting background 
checks are not in general public use.  Although it will be pointed out that the 
personal information is already stored with various governmental agencies 
before police officers obtain a suspect’s name, merely possessing personal 
information is significantly different from linking that information to a name 
and face.  In this sense, it is important not to lose sight of the context: a 
 
 162. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001) (recognizing technology has 
affected the “degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment”). 
 163. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548–49 (1968). 
 164. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nevada, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2464 (2004) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (stating that “[a] name can provide the key to a broad array of information about 
the person, particularly in the hands of a police officer with access to a range of law enforcement 
databases.”); Martin Finucane, For Police, It’s Gun, Badge and Blackberry — Use of Hand-held 
Devices to Access Databases Stirs Privacy Concerns, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), June 25, 
2004, at 10 (stating that police departments are purchasing hand-held wireless devices for use on 
patrols that permit officers to access “computerized dossiers on people on demand.”).  The Hiibel 
Court acknowledged as much, stating that “[k]nowledge of identity may inform an officer that a 
suspect is wanted for another offense, or has a record of violence or mental disorder.”  124 S. Ct. 
at 2458. 
 165. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 (1986) (stating that use of airplane to 
conduct search of curtilage did not establish a search); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 
227, 238–39 (1986) (approving of use of enhanced aerial photography of an industrial complex). 
 166. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40. 
 167. Cf. John J. Brogan, Facing the Music: The Dubious Constitutionality of Facial 
Recognition Technology, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 65, 84–85 (2002) (arguing that when 
officers use facial-scanning technology to obtain personal information that would otherwise not 
be available to them and thus make “an end run around the Fourth Amendment[,]” a search has 
occurred). 
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criminal investigation.  Officers will tie the personal information to an 
individual as a possible perpetrator of criminal activity.  Perhaps because of the 
substantial personal information governmental authorities can access using a 
name, it is not uncommon for those who come in contact with the police, both 
as victims and suspects of crimes, to refuse to identify themselves.168 
Considering a police officer’s technological superiority in using 
identification to access wider information on a suspect’s background, 
compelling a Terry suspect to identify herself under penalty of arrest through a 
“stop and identify” statute is only a few degrees removed from an officer 
threatening a suspect with arrest unless she opens the trunk of her car.  It is an 
act that forces an individual to expose personal information.  Not every person 
will consider providing identification to be substantially intrusive, just as not 
every person objects strongly to allowing officers to view the automobile 
trunk.  All the same, in light of the potential to uncover sensitive information, 
both acts implicate expectations of privacy that society would consider 
reasonable.169  Therefore, compelling identification during a Terry stop is a 
search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 
2. Broadening a Terry Search and Seizure 
Although it sanctions the seizure of identifying information, the Hiibel 
decision devotes little discussion to the original rationale for permitting a 
nonconsensual search and seizure during a Terry encounter: discovery of 
concealed weapons to protect officers.  Instead, Hiibel’s central concern is the 
important investigatory interests furthered by compelled identification.170  The 
opinion mentions officer safety only to say that investigating officers “need to 
know whom they are dealing with.”171  Terry, however, does not grant such 
wide latitude to search.  In Terry, the Court stated that a search must “be 
 
 168. Karen Abbott, Warnings Precede Party Conventions; FBI, Police Visits to Young People 
Rile ACLU Official, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, July 24, 2004, at 4A (reporting on Denver-area activists 
who refused to give their names to police officers, who in turn refused to give their names to the 
activists); Dan Chapman, Give Name or Go to Jail: Court Upholds Power to Arrest, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., June 22, 2004, at A1 (discussing protestors’ refusal to give names during the civil rights 
movement and anti-abortion demonstrations in 1988); Law & Order, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland) , 
Oct. 25, 2002, at B3 (reporting that a shooting suspect refused to give his name to police but was 
later identified through fingerprints); Dan Benson, Firework Debris May Have Fallout, 
MILWAUKEE J.-SENTINEL, July 11, 2002, at 3B (reporting on victim who did not want to give her 
name to police); Law & Order, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Mar. 29, 2002, at 35 (reporting on 
a robbery and assault victim who refused to give his name to police); Ed Hayward, Several 
Hospitalized in Hub Following Weekend Melees, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 12, 1999, at 13 
(reporting on weekend melees in which one injured man refuse to give his name to the police). 
 169. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 170. See Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2458 (2004). 
 171. Id. 
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confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, 
clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer.”172  In 
Michigan v. Long, the Court reaffirmed that the Terry doctrine permits 
searches intended to protect the officer, but only for the purpose of discovering 
weapons.173  Indeed, the Court has cautioned that “[i]f the protective search 
goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no 
longer valid under Terry and its fruits will be suppressed.”174  Terry thus 
created “a limited right of ‘self defense’ for a police officer who in carrying 
out her duties comes across someone whom she reasonably believes is armed 
and dangerous.”175 
Hiibel, though, takes a different path by advancing a non-weapons-based 
officer safety justification for the search and seizure: information regarding a 
suspect’s background.  However, whatever the safety advantages afforded by 
compelling identification, they are too attenuated from a search for weapons to 
be justified under Terry’s weapon-based rationale for protective searches.  If 
Hiibel is to serve as a blueprint for future Terry doctrine cases, the Court has 
swept aside a significant restriction on Terry searches.  Hiibel, therefore, 
signals the arrival of a breed of Terry search that is far broader than the “stop 
and frisk” approved of in Terry. 
Moreover, Hiibel makes no mention of the requirement that a Terry 
investigation be “confined in scope.”176  In Florida v. Royer, the Court stated 
that in carrying out a Terry stop, the “investigative methods employed should 
be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify . . . the officer’s 
suspicion in a short period of time.”177  Yet, the Hiibel Court disregarded this 
admonition, instead emphasizing the de minimis aspect of the compelled 
identification and thus harkening to the per curiam approach in Mimms.178  
Surely, considering Royer’s admonition, there were less intrusive means to 
verify or dispel the deputy’s suspicions than forcing Hiibel to identify himself 
under penalty of arrest and prosecution.179  Although a history of prior criminal 
acts might have indicated that Hiibel was statistically more likely than a person 
without a criminal record to engage in future criminal activity,180 the presence 
 
 172. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968). 
 173. 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) (stating that under Terry “protection of police and others can 
justify protective searches”). 
 174. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993). 
 175. Sundby, supra note 53, at 1135. 
 176. Terry, 392 U.S. at 29. 
 177. 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). 
 178. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2461 (characterizing the disclosure of a 
name as vastly Ainsignificant in the scheme of things@). 
 179. There is no indication in the decision of whether the deputy attempted to question the 
daughter or to look for visible evidence of domestic assault. 
 180. JOHN MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESSMENT OF CLINICAL 
TECHNIQUES 104–05 (1981) (concluding that violent crime in particular is the most reliable 
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or absence of such a record would not answer the specific investigative inquiry 
of whether Hiibel had committed domestic assault and thus would have 
required further investigation in any case.  The Court, however, expressed no 
interest in determining whether the State’s arrest and prosecution of Hiibel was 
the “least intrusive means reasonably available” for investigating the domestic 
violence report.  In ignoring the rule that a Terry investigation be restricted in 
scope, Hiibel grants broad investigatory license to officers at the expense of 
Terry suspects. 
Hiibel can thus be understood to represent the triumph of the de minimis 
approach within Terry jurisprudence.  As manifested in Hiibel, the Mimms 
dissenters’ fear of a precipitous slippery slope eroding the Fourth 
Amendment’s probable cause requirement for seizures has proven prescient.  
Under the majority’s analysis, it is no chimerical stretch to conclude that other 
identifying factual information such as a suspect’s address, ultimate destination 
of travel, or residency status may be compelled in the future.181  Such 
information has just as tangential a connection to officer safety as the name at 
issue in Hiibel.  It is not hard to imagine what other sorts of investigative 
methods police might lawfully pursue during a Terry stop under the de 
minimis approach: fingerprinting,182 demanding production of documents,183 
 
indication of future violent crime); Andrew R. Klein, Re-Abuse in a Population of 
Court-Restrained Male Batterers: Why Restraining Orders Don’t Work, in DO ARRESTS AND 
RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 193–202 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996) (stating 
that age and prior criminal history are statistically significant in indicating future domestic 
violence); Roger C. Park, Character at the Crossroads, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 717, 721–22 (1998) 
(“Recidivism data, whatever its faults and shortcomings, at a minimum shows that someone who 
has been convicted and imprisoned for a criminal offense is many times more likely to commit a 
similar offense than a person chosen at random.”).  Cf. id. at 721 n.10 (noting that “prediction of 
future crime based on prior offenses is fraught with difficulties”). 
 181. Based on Hiibel, the Fourth Circuit has already seemingly approved of compelling 
information regarding immigration status, though the facts given in the opinion were sparse.  
United States v. Castillo-Cuevas, No. 04-4155, slip op. at 2, 3 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2004) (per 
curiam). 
 182. The Court, in Hayes v. Florida, suggested in dictum that on-site fingerprinting absent 
probable cause is permissible under the Fourth Amendment: 
There is thus support in our cases for the view that the Fourth Amendment would permit 
seizures for the purpose of fingerprinting, if there is reasonable suspicion that the suspect 
has committed a criminal act, if there is a reasonable basis for believing that 
fingerprinting will establish or negate the suspect’s connection with that crime, and if the 
procedure is carried out with dispatch. 
470 U.S. 811, 817 (1985). 
 183. Even before Hiibel, some courts had approved of searching a suspect’s wallet during a 
Terry stop.  E.g., United States v. Garcia, 942 F.2d 873, 877 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating that a search 
of a defendant’s wallet during a Terry stop was reasonable when border patrol agents had 
reasonable suspicion that the defendant was an illegal alien and the defendant refused to disclose 
his identity or citizenship status); People v. Loudermilk, 241 Cal. Rptr. 208, 210, 212 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1987) (permitting search of wallet during Terry stop).  Most courts that have addressed the 
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skin and hair sampling,184 or facial scanning.185  With these sorts of 
investigative tactics lurking on the horizon, it becomes problematic to sincerely 
characterize a Terry stop as a “far more minimal intrusion” than a traditional 
arrest.186 
B. The Growing Fourth Amendment Hinterland Between Freedom and 
Arrest 
In first authorizing “stop and frisk” searches, the Supreme Court stressed 
that it was creating a limited exception to the overarching constitutional 
requirement that probable cause accompany any seizure and search.  Since 
then, however, the Court has expanded the breadth of a Terry stop well beyond 
its original, limited beginnings.  In this sense, the Hiibel decision is another 
step in the Court’s steady expansion of governmental power and authority 
during a Terry stop.  By divorcing a Terry suspect from well-established 
constitutional rights that would otherwise be available, however, Hiibel is a 
particularly significant step in the continuing journey of Terry expansion.  
Hiibel deepens the chasm between ordinary street encounters with police and 
Terry stops.  At the same time, Terry stops remain distinct from traditional 
arrests.  Hiibel and its predecessors have created, through the Terry doctrine, a 
sort of Fourth Amendment hinterland permitting suspension of fundamental 
constitutional rights and arrest-like seizures based on reasonable suspicion 
alone. 
The general right to not speak has developed into an entrenched 
constitutional right as applied to both opinion,187 and fact.188  In the Fourth 
Amendment context, the Court has observed that the right to not speak holds 
during ordinary police-civilian street encounters.  Justice Harlan, concurring in 
Terry, opined that, just as an officer does not offend the Fourth Amendment by 
 
issue, however, have held that officers may not search a suspect’s wallet during a Terry stop.  
E.g., State v. Webber, 694 A.2d 970, 972 (N.H. 1997); Baldwin v. State, 418 So. 2d 1219, 1220 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Newman, 637 P.2d 143, 146 (Or. 1981); Schraff v. State, 544 
P.2d 834, 851 (Alaska 1975).  The Hiibel Court’s limiting language that it did not understand the 
Nevada statute to compel a suspect to turn over any documentation, see Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 
2457, gives no insight into how it would rule on a Terry search of a wallet. 
 184. See D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 455, 461 (2001) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment does not preclude DNA 
sampling from arrestees, but that such a sampling system would have to “incorporate stringent 
controls on the scope of the information extracted from the samples and the dissemination of that 
information.”). 
 185. See Brogan, supra note 167, at 67–69 (discussing facial scanning technology and 
arguing that wide area facial scans are unconstitutional per se, while focused facial scans are 
constitutional if accompanied by reasonable suspicion). 
 186. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126 (2000). 
 187. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1977). 
 188. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 797–98 (1988). 
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addressing questions to others she encounters, “ordinarily the person addressed 
has an equal right to ignore his interrogator and walk away.”189  Moreover, in 
Florida v. Royer, the Court noted that, absent reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause, an individual approached by a police officer “need not answer any 
question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and 
may go on his way.”190  This remains the law, even after Hiibel. 
Apart from ordinary police-civilian street encounters, however, the well-
settled constitutional right to not speak does not apply during a Terry stop.  
Under Hiibel, officers may compel any person whom they reasonably suspect 
of unlawful activity to identify themselves.191  This establishes a stark contrast 
of liberty rights between a Terry stop and non-obligatory street encounters 
where an individual “need not answer any question put to him.”192  While 
Terry stops have always been understood to be a restriction on liberty,193 the 
Court has described a Terry stop as a “minimal” and “limited” intrusion upon 
individual liberty.194  With Hiibel permitting offhanded revocation of 
constitutional rights during a Terry stop, however, it cannot be said that a Terry 
stop is only a marginal imposition on personal liberty.  A Terry stop has thus 
become sharply severed from ordinary street life. 
At the same time, Hiibel maintains the increasingly untenable doctrinal 
divide between a Terry stop and a formal arrest.  If the facts in Hiibel had 
occurred against the backdrop of a formal arrest, the deputy would have been 
required to possess probable cause and would have likely read Hiibel his 
Miranda warnings before forcing him to speak in order to preserve any 
potentially incriminating comments for trial.195  Paradoxically, these additional 
protections were unavailable to Hiibel precisely because officers possessed a 
lesser degree of suspicion of wrongdoing and seized Hiibel in a manner that, in 
theory, is less intrusive than an arrest.  Given the additional individual 
safeguards and procedural hurdles accompanying a formal arrest, it is not 
difficult to surmise that, if they had their druthers, police officers would prefer 
 
 189. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 32–33 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 190. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983).  See also Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125 
(reaffirming Royer’s holding that “when an officer, without reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause, approaches an individual, the individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his 
business.”). 
 191. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2458 (2004). 
 192. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 498. 
 193. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16. 
 194. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 126 (describing a Terry stop as a “minimal intrusion”); United 
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 689 (1985) (describing a Terry stop as “brief and narrowly 
circumscribed”); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 366 n.4 (1983) (describing a Terry 
encounter as “limited”); Terry, 392 U.S. at 26 (describing a Terry stop as a “wholly different kind 
of intrusion upon individual freedom”). 
 195. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 434 (1984) (stating that Miranda warnings are 
required for post-arrest custodial interrogation). 
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to initially approach a suspect possessing only reasonable suspicion rather than 
probable cause.196 
On the whole, then, Hiibel broadens the gray area, largely barren of 
constitutional safeguards, between freedom and arrest.  A dexterous and 
amorphous creature, distinct from freedom and divorced from arrest, the Terry 
stop thrives in this peculiar no-man’s land.  With the power to suspend the 
fundamental constitutional right to not speak, it is clear that a Terry stop is far 
removed from the freedom an individual enjoys before arousing suspicion.  On 
the other hand, a Terry stop is unburdened by the heightened proof 
requirements and Fifth Amendment protections applicable to a formal arrest.  
Considering the state of the Terry doctrine following Hiibel, it is apparent that 
the Terry stop has morphed into an existence far removed from its humble 
“stop and frisk” origins.  With officers able to compel individuals reasonably 
suspected of committing a crime to identify themselves under Hiibel, the 
notion that the Terry doctrine might “swallow the general rule that Fourth 
Amendment seizures are >reasonable= only if based on probable cause[,]”197 as 
earlier feared by members of the Court,198 is far from fanciful. 
VI.  AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: 
REVALUING INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY INTERESTS 
It is apparent from the Nevada Supreme Court’s opinion that the 
intensified post-9/11 security paradigm played a key role in the court’s 
decision.  The Nevada Supreme Court issued its decision in Hiibel on 
December 20, 2002, a little more than fifteen months following the terrorist 
attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001.  In 
holding that the Nevada “stop and identify” statute did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment, the court, identifying the significant governmental interests 
served by compelled identification, observed, “[m]ost importantly, we are at 
war against enemies who operate with concealed identities and the dangers we 
face as a nation are unparalleled.”199  The court referred to the terrorist attacks 
of September 11th, the Washington, D.C. sniper killings, and the white-powder 
Anthrax scares that followed.  Quoting the President, the Court stated that “[i]t 
cannot be stressed enough: ‘This is a different kind of war that requires a 
different type of approach and a different type of mentality.’”200  The court 
thus suggested that in the post-9/11 world the manner of evaluating individual 
 
 196. Cf. Susan Bandes, Terry v. Ohio in Hindsight: The Perils of Predicting the Past, 16 
CONST. COMMENT. 491, 494 (1999) (stating that the Terry doctrine’s expansion has “permit[ted] 
numerous police practices to flourish, unaccompanied by probable cause, a warrant, or, in many 
cases, any level of suspicion at all.”). 
 197. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979). 
 198. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 510 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 199. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. ex rel. Humboldt, 59 P.3d 1201, 1206 (Nev. 2002). 
 200. Id. 
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privacy rights under the Bill of Rights had been inexorably altered.  Given the 
looming terrorist threat, the court would accordingly afford greater deference 
to police officers investigating suspicious activity during a Terry stop.201 
Undoubtedly, the terrorist attacks of September 11th created a momentous 
shift in the nation’s collective security outlook.  Significant measures were 
taken both internationally and domestically to address the terrorist threat, 
including the creation of an executive agency, the Department of Homeland 
Security, which subsumed and reorganized previously existing administrative 
agencies and is charged with coordinating domestic security.202  Although the 
Supreme Court’s Hiibel opinion did not refer to the September 11th terrorist 
attacks, the United States, arguing as amici in support of Nevada, noted the 
Nevada Supreme Court’s reference to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and mentioned 
identification of persons on terrorist “watch lists” as an important justification 
for the Nevada “stop and identify” statute.203  Whether the terrorist attacks of 
September 11th affected the Court’s decision in Hiibel is unknown.  Clearly, 
however, the dramatic post-9/11 shift in governmental attitudes towards 
security did not pass unnoticed.204  That the traumatic events of September 
11th would affect the balancing of governmental interests and privacy interests 
in evaluating the validity of a Fourth Amendment claim is understandable and 
permissible.205  The more perilous security conditions brought to light by the 
terrorist attacks, however, do not justify broad infringements on the individual 
rights secured by the Constitution.206  In this sense, the Court’s comments over 
 
 201. Id. 
 202. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002) 
(current version at 6 U.S.C. § 101 (2004)). 
 203. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States Supporting Respondent at 14–15, Hiibel v. Sixth 
Jud. Dist. Ct., 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004) (No. 03-5554). 
 204. Docketed on the same 2003 term and argued approximately one month after Hiibel were 
two cases involving the indefinite detention of U.S. citizens suspected of terrorist activity, Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004), and Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004), and one 
case involving the legal status of enemy combatants held at the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). 
 205. See Ronald M. Gould & Simon Stern, Catastrophic Threats and the Fourth Amendment, 
77 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 777–78 (2004) (stating that traditional Fourth Amendment analysis is 
inadequate “in an age of weapons of mass destruction and potential terrorism,” and proposing an 
extension of the “special needs” exception to the probable cause requirement to account for this 
inadequacy).  See also Richard S. Frase, What Were They Thinking? Fourth Amendment 
Unreasonableness in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 329, 417 (2002) 
(stating that if the Court were to grant police officers broader investigative authority in the name 
of combating terrorism, “it will face increased pressure to impose additional limitations on police 
powers in very minor cases” because reasonableness analysis “cannot be allowed to become a 
‘one way street, to be used only to water down’ Fourth Amendment rights” (quoting Gooding v. 
United States, 416 U.S. 430, 495 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting))). 
 206. See Gould & Stern, supra note 205, at 830 (warning, in proposing an exception to the 
probable cause requirements in the case of catastrophic threats, that “courts as well as citizens 
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half-a-century ago in Barnette, decided after the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor and during the tumultuous national emergency of World War II, are 
instructive.  Although the Barnette Court acknowledged the importance of 
promoting patriotism among the population, especially during wartime, the 
Court warned that the noble aim of strengthening the nation could not be 
achieved at the cost of waylaying the Bill of Rights.207  Constitutional rights, 
the Court instructed, were not impediments to national strength and unity, but 
rather vehicles towards that end: “Government of limited power need not be 
anemic government.  Assurance that rights are secure tends to diminish fear 
and jealousy of strong government, and by making us feel safe to live under it 
makes for its better support.”208  Certainly, the present “war against terror” is 
unlike the United States’s previous military struggles.  Barnette’s admonition, 
however, still serves as a relevant reminder of the importance of Constitutional 
rights. 
In considering a remedy for the potential evils of unchecked expansion of 
the Terry doctrine, a measured approach is appropriate.  It makes little sense to 
suggest discarding the Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis that formed 
the basis for the Terry doctrine’s expansion and sowed the seeds of the Hiibel 
decision.209  It is similarly foolish to imagine that the necessities of law 
enforcement will not play a critical role in future Terry stop cases, especially 
given the post-9/11 security context.210  Any plausible approach, therefore, 
should weave into the existing reasonableness framework.  This does not imply 
limitation, but rather possibility.  Indeed, one of the principal virtues of 
reasonableness analysis is its ability to accommodate a variety of factual 
 
must be mindful to avoid the risk, if possible, that a solution designed to prevent wholesale 
destruction of life and property does not destroy the basis values that undergird our civic life.”); 
Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the Fourth 
Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1364–65 (2004) 
(stating that the Fourth Amendment challenge posed by the war on terror is “to assure that, even 
as courts allow government officials to hunt more vigorously for evidence of criminal activity or 
signs of terrorist threats, and use new technologies to do so, they do not compromise those core 
privacy protections that are integral to a free society.”). 
 207. W. Va. State Bd. Of Educ. V. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 636–37 (1943). 
 208. Id. at 636. 
 209. Sundby, supra note 53, at 1134 (acknowledging that “[t]he Reasonableness Clause is 
now an important part of Fourth Amendment analysis and it is unrealistic and, perhaps, unwise to 
urge a return to the pre-Terry days when the Reasonableness Clause largely served as a redundant 
way of saying a ‘warrant based on probable cause.’”). 
 210. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 
222 (1998) (“In any civilized society the most important task is achieving a proper balance 
between freedom and order.  In wartime, reason and history both suggest that this balance 
shifts . . . in favor of order—in favor of the government’s ability to deal with conditions that 
threaten the national well-being.”). 
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scenarios and at the same time account for evolving societal norms.211  With 
regard to halting the steady expansion of the Terry doctrine that ultimately 
produced Hiibel, it is not the mere use of the reasonableness balancing test that 
must be reevaluated but the manner in which courts employ the reasonableness 
test: Individual privacy interests must be given due weight as they are balanced 
against governmental law enforcement interests. 
Individual privacy interests have not been adequately accounted for over 
the course of the Terry doctrine’s expansion.212  Governmental interests have 
generally trumped individual privacy interests in the name of furthering law 
enforcement needs.213  In effect, what is reflected in Hiibel and other Terry-
doctrine expansion cases is the triumph of the de minimis approach, first 
articulated in Mimms.214  Following Mimms, the Court has justified extensions 
of police authority during a Terry stop as “minimal”215 or “insignificant”216 
intrusions on individual privacy interests.217  This is problematic.  Use of the 
de minimis approach overly minimizes the individual privacy interests at stake 
during a Terry encounter.  Over time, any privacy interest can be overcome by 
incremental application of the de minimis approach.  The de minimis approach 
is not neutral; it favors governmental interests over privacy interests.218  Courts 
have not employed the de minimis approach to justify “minor” restrictions on 
police authority—a sort of negative de minimis approach; rather the de 
minimis approach operates only to augment police authority. 
 
 211. See Amar, supra note 51, at 1118 (stating that reasonableness’s spacious quality “is one 
of its virtues.”). Cf. Kathryn R. Urbonya, Rhetorically Reasonable Police Practices: Viewing the 
Supreme Court’s Multiple Discourse Paths, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1387, 1418–25 (2003) 
(arguing that reasonableness is a shifting concept in Supreme Court Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence). 
 212. Cooper, supra note 63, at 892–93 (discussing the levels of discretion afforded a finding 
of reasonable suspicion on appellate review and arguing that, based on the discretion accorded a 
finding of reasonable suspicion, “we cannot say individuals’ privacy interests have any real 
weight in the [Terry] balancing test.”). 
 213. See Yale Kamisar, The Fourth Amendment: The Right of the People to Be Secure in 
Their Persons, Homes, Papers, and Effects, in A TIME FOR CHOICES 31, 33 (Claudia A. Haskel & 
Jean H. Otto eds., 1991) (arguing that it is not surprising that government interests prevail when 
the balancing test is used since “[t]his is usually the result when the Court utilizes what the 
dissenters aptly called ‘a formless and unguided “reasonableness” balancing inquiry’”); Charles 
A. Reich, The Individual Sector, 100 YALE L.J. 1409, 1417 (1991) (stating that in the 1989-90 
Supreme Court term, individual privacy interests were typically minimized when contrasted with 
State interests). 
 214. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977). 
 215. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414–15 (1997). 
 216. See Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2461 (2004). 
 217. Trappings of the de minimis approach were also evident before Mimms in United States 
v. Martinez-Fuerte, where the Court stated that the intrusion on privacy interests caused by a 
routine check-point stop “is quite limited.”  428 U.S. 543, 557 (1976). 
 218. E.g., Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414–15; Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111. 
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Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis cannot function so 
disproportionately.  Individual privacy interests must be properly valued in 
assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s coercive power during a Terry 
stop.  To pay short shrift to privacy interests contravenes the very purpose of 
the Fourth Amendment: to safeguard the people from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion.219  Perhaps Justice Jackson, who served as the chief 
U.S. prosecutor before the Nuremberg war crimes tribunal, was in the best 
position to articulate the importance of upholding the rights conferred by the 
Fourth Amendment in the midst of a crisis of unprecedented political upheaval.  
Justice Jackson’s legal jurisprudence was profoundly influenced by World War 
II and his experiences in Nuremberg,220 which he deemed “the most important, 
enduring, and constructive work of my life.”221  His views on the Fourth 
Amendment following his return to the Court are enlightening: 
[The rights ensured by the Fourth Amendment], I protest, are not mere 
second-class rights but belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. 
Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, 
crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart.  
Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons 
in the arsenal of every arbitrary government.  And one need only briefly to 
have dwelt and worked among a people possessed of many admirable qualities 
but deprived of these rights to know that the human personality deteriorates 
and dignity and self-reliance disappear where homes, persons and possessions 
are subject at any hour to unheralded search and seizure by the police.222 
 
 219. See Harris, supra note 144, at 439 (stating that the historical evidence shows that “the 
Fourth Amendment was intended to limit government action and discretion to conduct . . . 
searches and seizures without warrants.”); Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 228–29 (1993) (arguing that the “historical evidence” 
suggests that the “broad principle embodied in the Reasonableness Clause is that discretionary 
police power implicating Fourth Amendment interests cannot be trusted.”); Donald L. Doernberg, 
The Right of the People: Reconciling Collective and Individual Interests Under the Fourth 
Amendment, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 259, 260 (1983) (“The fourth amendment was intended both to 
protect the rights of individuals and to prevent the government from functioning as in a police 
state.”).  See also Thomas B. McAffee & Michael J. Quinlan, Bringing Forward the Right to 
Keep and Bear Arms: Do Text, History, or Precedent Stand in the Way?, 75 N.C. L. REV. 781, 
829–30 (1997) (stating that the first eight amendments to the Constitution “stemmed from a 
general fear that the national government was empowered by the Constitution to invade 
well-established rights of importance to the people.”). 
 220. Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 842 
(1994) (stating that “Justice Jackson returned to the Supreme Court a fervent believer in the 
warrant requirement.”); Dennis J. Hutchinson, Justice Jackson and the Nuremberg Trials, 1996 J. 
SUP. CT. HIST. 105, 114 (1996). 
 221. Robert H. Jackson, Introduction to WHITNEY R. HARRIS, TYRANNY ON TRIAL: THE 
EVIDENCE AT NUREMBERG xxxvii (1954). 
 222. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180–81 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
316 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:279 
Reasonableness analysis must take account of the central, privacy-guarding 
function the Fourth Amendment has played in U.S. jurisprudence.  
Fundamentally, the reasonableness balancing test must disavow the de minimis 
approach altogether so that both governmental law enforcement interests and 
individual privacy interests are weighed against each other, independent of any 
built-in, doctrinal bias.  Mindful of the high value historically placed on 
constitutional rights, individual privacy interests must be properly valued in the 
balancing test.  By no means does this suggest that privacy interests should 
always trump governmental interests.  Such a myopic focus on individual 
privacy interests would be just as wrongheaded as a reasonableness analysis 
perpetually favoring governmental interests.223  Rather what is needed is an 
impartial balancing test in which there is no intimation that the outcome is 
predetermined.224 
Just as the Court in Barnette and Justice Jackson in Brinegar recognized 
the importance of upholding individual constitutional rights at the height of 
one of the most significant struggles in U.S. history, the profound value of the 
Constitution’s safeguards on individual privacy interests should not be lost 
upon us now.  The country has undergone grave challenges in the past yet 
maintained its adherence to the ideals expressed in the Bill of Rights.  As we 
deal with the challenges presented in the present era, we should heed the 
Court’s instruction and Justice Jackson’s views that the rights conferred upon 
the people by the Constitution are a source of strength, not a vulnerability. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Hiibel’s impact on the Terry doctrine cannot be overstated.  Although it is 
only one of many cases to have extended the original boundaries of a Terry 
stop, Hiibel affects a privilege previously thought to have been left intact by 
Terry: the right not to speak.  In reaching this result, Hiibel overrides prior 
language from the Court suggesting that police officers violate the Fourth 
Amendment by compelling Terry suspects to identify themselves. 
 
 223. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963) (stating that “while the 
Constitution protects against invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact.”). 
 224. Commentators have suggested that the current reasonableness balancing test implicitly 
favors governmental interests over individual privacy interests. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, 
Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 554 
(1992) (stating that when reasonableness analysis “applies, the government wins, save perhaps for 
a few egregious cases.”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, On the Fourth Amendment Rights of the 
Law-Abiding Public, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 87, 109 (stating that “[d]eference to alleged 
governmental interests now appears to be the rule.”); Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in 
the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1188–89 (1988) (stating that use of the balancing test contributes to the 
erosion of Fourth Amendment rights); Sundby, supra note 14, at 400–01 (arguing that the 
balancing test favors government intrusion). 
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Perhaps the most significant aspect of Hiibel for Fourth Amendment 
purposes is its potential to broaden the scope of permissible searches and 
seizures during a Terry encounter.  By minimizing the rule that a Terry search 
must be limited to a search for weapons and confined in scope, the door is 
open to increasingly sweeping Terry searches.  At this historical juncture, the 
balance of governmental law-enforcement interests and individual privacy 
interests seems skewed in favor of enhancing investigatory power. 
Hiibel’s significant contribution to the steady expansion of the Terry 
doctrine is illustrative of the broadening Fourth Amendment hinterland 
between freedom and arrest now occupied by the Terry doctrine.  While 
described as “less intrusive of a person’s liberty interests than a formal 
arrest[,]”225 or “a far more minimal intrusion”226 than an arrest, a Terry stop, as 
it develops more arrest-like attributes and permits a wide range of law 
enforcement activity, has grown well beyond its Warren Court britches.  The 
Court’s endorsement of compelled identification in Hiibel has elevated a Terry 
stop to a unique position in Fourth Amendment law.  Far removed from 
freedom where the constitutional right to not speak is by all indications intact, 
yet unfettered by the restrictions applicable to formal arrest, the Terry doctrine 
now grants officers the authority to compel identification.  Indeed, by 
loosening the Terry doctrine from its original moorings, Hiibel may be the 
harbinger of a revamped Terry doctrine that would scarcely be recognizable to 
the Terry Court. 
If the continuing expansion of the Terry doctrine is to be reined in and 
future broad extensions of police authority such as Hiibel are to be avoided, 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis cannot continue to operate in a 
disparate manner.  The use of the de minimis approach in reasonableness 
balancing only works to augment police authority during a Terry stop.  In order 
to accord proper deference to the high historical value placed in the Fourth 
Amendment and to return to the Court’s original intent in Terry of strictly 
circumscribing police authority during a Terry stop, the de minimis approach 
must be renounced.  An unbiased reasonableness balancing approach must 
weigh governmental law enforcement interests equally against individual 
privacy interests.  Only then can the slippery slope of eroding individual rights, 
steepened by Hiibel, be leveled to parity. 
 
 225. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 705 (1983). 
 226. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126 (2000). 
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